Sympathy and Antipathy in the 21st Century

Adam Smith’s An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations left an unmatched mark on the world and is still the main reason why he is remembered. But what if Smith were more concerned today about philosophy rather than economics? What if 300 years of history made the evolution of the moral sentiments he identified in his other major work, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, a more urgent topic than any other? 

Western democracies are growing more polarized. But why? Smith argues in The Theory of Moral Sentiments that individuals behave in their own interest but form an idea of what is fair by placing themselves in other people’s shoes.[1] In that context, a question that he could ask himself today is: Is antipathy, instead of sympathy, becoming increasingly popular? 

Perhaps, Smith could write, people are still trying to earn other people’s sympathy, just not everyone’s. But for some reason, many today seem to find joy in provoking and being disliked by others. In online environments, for example, some people are quite friendly amongst each other, but they constantly seek to cause ‘tears’ of their opponents on social media. But why? Why would people consciously want to be disliked by others? Or how is it that, for example, American conservatives and progressives are becoming less and less likely to marry one another?  This topic warrants further investigation. 

It also seems like the causal mechanisms with which sympathy is supposed to work could also be put under scrutiny today. For some reason, hate now positively appeals to many people: Some individuals would not only support, but would do anything to protect a leader of theirs that speaks or does the worst things imaginable.  Yet this goes directly against Smith’s intuition that hatred and spite ‘are by nature the objects of our aversion.’[2] 

In terms of Smith’s theory, perhaps people are not learning to be sympathetic anymore. Smith’s ‘ideal man within the breast,’ after all, must be taught to behave like one, which necessarily happens in the presence of others. ‘The man within the breast, the abstract and ideal spectator of our sentiments and conduct, requires often to be awakened and put in mind of his duty, by the presence of the real spectator.’[3] And who are these spectators? Friends, for example, are an important part of this process. But if 40% of people do not have a single close friend who backs a candidate different than theirs, how can they know how they feel? How can people learn from peers that are no different from them? 

The political consequences of downward changes in the level of sympathy could be dramatic. If more individuals are unable to place themselves in other people’s shoes, it will likely become more difficult to maintain rules of justice based on mutual understanding in the future. For liberal democracies, this would be a dangerous development: Notions such ‘equality before the law’ could stop conveying the meaning they do today if a person who could have been my neighbor suddenly becomes a complete stranger. How can we protect everyone’s right to liberty in such a context? This problem need not manifest itself immediately, but it cannot be ruled out if antipathy persists in the future. 

Reflecting on the evolution of sympathy and antipathy could also enlighten aspects of today’s economic beliefs, which would likely be of Smith’s interest as well. Declining sympathy could be connected to the surge of protectionist views that so-called ‘populist’ leaders have supported in recent years across Western democracies, and it could explain the persistence of these beliefs even when we know that they are wrong. Indeed, if there is a tendency to believe that others represent a danger rather than an opportunity, it makes sense that people will want to protect themselves against them. 

Smith sayst ‘just indignation for evil’ could be a proper motive for hurting another person[4] But if this is true, then other questions arise: What causes this indignation and why is it perceived as ‘just’? How is it that people can feel outraged at others’ beliefs or seemingly innocent actions like trading goods and services? 

These issues are not new. We are certainly not experiencing the first-ever attacks on the desire to live under a liberal system where people set rules of justice, abide by them, and then mostly mind their own business. Liberals, though, may not be fully aware of just how deep the moral sentiments of those who would like to impose their rules on everyone else are becoming. 

If our diagnosis is correct, then it is of paramount importance to increase sympathy in our daily lives. And, if Smith’s theory of moral sentiments is right, perhaps fostering the cultivation of the ‘man within the breast’ through education, contemplation and socialization is the way to do it. The Theory of Moral Sentiments offers a great opportunity to study the world in the 21st century. Even as new questions arise on the evolution of sympathy and antipathy, the way in which Adam Smith framed moral sentiments can still inform us on how the world works and what we can do to improve it. 

[1] Adam Smith (2004 [1759]), The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Cambridge University Press. See Part 1, Section 1, Chapters 1-2.
[2] Smith, op. cit., p. 45.
[3] Smith, op. cit., p. 178.
[4] Smith, op. cit., p. 96.